This paper provides new testable predictions of heterogeneous …rm (HF) models for trade. Variations in trade policy, trade preferences, and the rules of origin (ROOs) needed to obtain them are incorporated into the model and some analytical means of dealing with the resulting asymmetries are developed. The policy di¤erences modelled correspond to di¤erences across products and destination markets for Bangladeshi garment exports to the US and EU. These turns out to provide an interesting natural experiment. Predictions of the model for the distributions of TFP of various groups of …rms are tested non-parametrically and are supported by the data.
Introduction
This paper models the responses of …rms that are heterogenous in productivity to the di¤erent types of trade policies they face in di¤erent product and export destinations. It presents direct evidence supportive of the model's predictions using a dataset of Bangladeshi garments exporters.
In particular, it focuses on the e¤ect of di¤erences in trade polices, trade preferences, and the rules of origin (ROOs) needed to obtain them, on the pattern of …rm exports and performance.
To date, the entire literature on trade policy assumes that …rms are homogeneous. 1 When …rms are homogeneous, they will not make di¤erent choices unless they are indi¤erent between the alternatives and even then, their choices will be random. If …rms do make systematically di¤erent choices, then homogenous …rm models, while useful, miss an essential part of the story. As a result, their predictions and policy prescriptions will be less nuanced 2 and may even be misleading.
For example, the correlation between being an exporter and having high TFP was interpreted as evidence that exporting raised productivity and that this was the reason to encourage exports.
However, work in the late 90's suggested that …rm heterogeneity plays a key role: exporters tend to be the more productive …rms, so that this policy advice might well be misleading. 3 In this vein, our work suggests that trade preferences granted to developing countries that favor more capital intensive sectors can distort their pattern of investment and trade. While such preferences tend to spur investment and exports of the more capital intensive sectors, they also reduce the average productivity of exporters and bias export away from the direction of natural comparative advantage.
Consequently, even liberal preferences may be far less e¤ective in promoting development than expected.
The empirical application is the apparel sector which has two major sub-sectors: garments made from woven cloth, and those made from non-woven material, namely, sweaters and knitwear. Firms that export garments made from woven cloth seem to behave very di¤erently from those exporting non-woven garments. Although the EU is the favored export destination for Bangladeshi …rms as a whole, it is less so for …rms making woven garments. While the EU bias can easily be explained in 1 See, for example, the work of Krueger (1999) , Krishna and Krueger (1995) , Ju and Krishna (2005) on modelling Rules of Origin. 2 For example, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2005) argue that trade liberalization forces …rms to focus on their core competencies, which provides an additional source of gains from liberalization. 3 See, for example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) , Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999) , and Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) . a standard homogeneous …rm setting by the less harsh trade policy of the EU overall, homogenous …rm models cannot explain another fact that is clear in the data: namely, …rms that export to the US are larger, more productive, and tend to export to more markets than those who export to the EU. This is especially so in the non-woven sector. Thus, we need a heterogeneous …rms setup that models the di¤erences in trade policy stances in the US and EU, as well as across woven and non-woven sectors.
Why look at Bangladesh? First, there are di¤erences across products (garments made from woven cloth and non woven ones) and export destinations (the EU and the US) that make for an interesting natural experiment. This is described in detail in the next section. Second, Bangladesh is among the major garment suppliers to both the EU and US markets. 4 Third, we have a unique …rm level data set (with information on costs as well as export destinations) for a sample of 350 garment exporters in Bangladesh that was collected under the auspices of the World Bank and the Government of Bangladesh. 5 We also have complete customs data on all exporting garment …rms in Bangladesh. This data was provided by the Bangladesh export authority. It has information on sales and volume of exports for the whole population of exporting …rms in 2004 by major destination markets.
Our theoretical model builds on the work of Melitz (2003) to see how …rms with di¤erent productivity behave as a result of di¤erences in the ROOs of the EU and US. We allow for ROOs to a¤ect both the …xed costs and marginal costs of exporting and model the di¤erences across markets and products. We show that the model makes a number of predictions about the mean productivities of various groups of …rms as well as the distributions of their productivities in terms of the …rst order stochastic dominance partial order. Thus, our work can be seen as a further test of heterogeneous …rm models.
Like Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003) , among others, our model also predicts that the more productive …rms are able to export to a larger number of markets, and speci…cally, that only the most productive can enter the markets where they face the most stringent trade restrictions 6 . Since tari¤s and ROOs are an important component of the US and EU trade policies 4 According to data obtained from Comtrade, in 2003, Bangladesh supplied $3.7 and $1.8 billion worth of apparel products to the EU and US, and ranked 7th and 8th in the two markets, respectively. 5 The same data set is also used in Kee (2006) to study the horizontal productivity spillover e¤ects of FDI …rms in the garment industries in Bangladesh. 6 That …rms in an industry do behave very di¤erently is now widely acknowledged. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004, 2005) , for example, model and document the major di¤erences among French …rms in terms of market towards developing country garments exporters, and since, as discussed below, while the tari¤s in the US are higher, it is harder to meet EU's ROOs requirements in the woven sector rather than non-woven sector, comparing the behavior of woven and non-woven sector …rms with respect to the EU and US markets o¤ers some sharp tests of the model's predictions. Both the model and data show that not only are those …rms that take advantage of the EU's less restrictive ROOs less productive than those …rms that export to the US, but also that this productivity di¤erence is smaller in the woven sector. These "di¤erence-in-di¤erence" types of predictions a¤orded by sectoral di¤erences in the e¤ective trade policy stance allow for sharper empirical tests than does the previous literature on heterogenous …rm models.
We estimate …rm productivity using Olley and Pakes (1996) , while allowing for …rm and year speci…c e¤ects in the estimation. The estimated …rm productivity is then related to export performance of the …rms. We consider both the within and between variation of the data set. We estimate the e¤ects of the trade policy di¤erences on mean …rm productivity 7 , using as controls the di¤er-ences between export destination markets as well as the di¤erences between sectors. In addition, we employ a nonparametric test of stochastic dominance developed in Anderson (1996) to compare the productivity distributions of …rms exporting to di¤erent markets in di¤erent industries. Our predictions are shown to be consistent with the data.
Thus, the contribution of this paper is as follows. First, our heterogenous …rm model shows how di¤erences in trade policy of the EU and US and in the preferences granted by them to Bangladesh, in combination with the ROOs needed to access them, act as a sorting mechanism for …rms. This results in productivity di¤erences between …rms that di¤er in their product lines and markets. We are able to capture both how …rm productivity di¤ers according to the toughness of the exporting market, and how the toughness of the market depends on ROOs and trade policy.
The former channel is missing in homogenous …rm models. Our model makes simple predictions about di¤erences in the market equilibrium in a heterogenous …rm setting as a result of such trade policy di¤erences. 8 Second, we take the model to the data and show that the empirical evidence supports the model's predictions. Thus, our paper adds to this growing literature: see, for example, participation and size. 7 The mean productivity is increasing in the cuto¤ level and so can be seen as a proxy for it. 8 Although there are a number of papers now dealing with heterogeneous …rm models in general equilibrium (see, for example, Melitz (2003) , Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Bernard, Redding, and Schott (forthcoming)), this paper is the …rst to our knowledge that focuses of the results of di¤erential trade policies.
Russ (forthcoming), and Eaton, Kramarz (2004, 2005) . 9 Finally, in the area of trade policy-for-growth, our paper suggests that liberal preferences given by the EU to Bangladesh, while spurring exports of the non-woven sector, may reduce its average productivity. Given that the non-woven sector is twice as capital intensive as the woven sector, 10 our result further implies that exports of Bangladesh are biased away from the direction of its natural comparative advantage, and as a result, may be less e¤ective in promoting development. 11 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of the trade environment in which the industry operates. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 lays out the theoretical model and outlines its predictions. The estimation of …rm productivity and tests of the model's predictions are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The details of the proofs are in the Appendix.
The Trade Environment
There are three main components of the trade environment, namely, the trade policy of the US and the EU, the trade preferences granted to Bangladesh, and rules of origin upon which preferences are conditional.
Trade Policy of the US and EU
Both the US and EU had trade restrictions in the Apparel industry in 2004-2005. The EU had an MFN tari¤ rate of 12-15% on the various categories of apparel. There were no quotas on Bangladesh, given its least developed country status. The US, on the other hand, had tari¤s of about 20% and quota restrictions in place in selected apparel categories. 12 Note also that as the quotas were country speci…c, exporting was contingent on obtaining origin: that is, unless the good 9 They model and document the major di¤erences among French …rms in terms of market participation, size, and export intensity. Our work complements theirs as we can construct TFP indices at a …rm level while they have to use di¤erences in value added across …rms.
1 0 The non-woven apparel industry is relatively new in Bangladesh but is the recipient of a lions share of new investment. 1 1 We will focus on this issue in future work. 1 2 Of the 924 HS 10 digit garment products Bangladesh exported to the US each year (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , half were subjected to quota restrictions. In terms of value, 74% of garment imports from Bangladesh were from the woven industry (HS62), and the remaining 26% came from the knitwear industry (HS61), which also included sweaters. Roughly 75% of Bangladeshi exports were under quota.
was shown to originate from Bangladesh, it could not enter under its quota. 13 
Trade Preferences Granted to Bangladesh
As a least developed country, Bangladesh was subject to zero tari¤s ( if it met origin requirements) on its EU exports of apparel under the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative. This gives it a substantial advantage in the EU over other developing countries, like India, who merely got GSP preferences within quota restrictions. GSP preferences would reduce an MFN tari¤ of 12% in the EU, by 20%, or about 2.4% in absolute terms. So India would pay 9.6% while Bangladesh would pay zero on their apparel exports to the EU. In addition, Bangladesh did not face quantity restrictions (quotas) on its garment exports, unlike, for example, India. On the other hand, in the US, Bangladesh did not have any trade preferences and had to compete head-to-head with garment products from other countries, such as India and China.
Rules of Origin
ROOs specify constraints that must be met in order to obtain origin and thereby qualify for country speci…c quotas or trade preferences. 14 They can take a variety of forms. The important thing to note is that, whatever the form, if ROOs are binding then the choice of inputs used in production di¤ers from the unconstrained ones. Hence, costs are higher if ROOs are met. Since more restrictive ROOs constrain choices more than do less restrictive ones, an increase in restrictiveness raises the minimized level of costs. Thus, from an analytical viewpoint, ROOs raise the production costs of the product when they are binding. 15 On the other hand, they may provide access to the market at a lower tari¤ and this bene…t has to be traded o¤ against the cost.
US ROOs regarding apparel products are governed by Section 334 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. 16 For the purpose of tari¤s and quotas, an apparel product is considered as originating from a country if it is wholly assembled in the country. No local fabric requirement 1 3 Note that less competitive countries are at less of an disadvantage in the US than they would be in the absence of the quota as the quota in e¤ect guarantees them a niche as long as they are not too ine¢ cient. Their ine¢ ciency reduces the price of their quota licenses, while the quota licenses of a very competitive country would be highly priced. 1 4 For a relatively comprehensive and up to date survey see Krishna (2006) . 1 5 In the same spirit, though formally not in the model, meeting ROOs in Bangladesh forces producers to rely on poorer quality domestic inputs (which make a lower quality garment with a lower price) rather than higher quality imported ones in order to obtain preferences. 1 6 For details, please, refer to the following website: http://www.washingtonwatchdog.org/documents/usc/ttl19/ch22/subchIII/ptB/sec3592.html is necessary. Thus, the products of a …rm are not penalized if the …rm chooses to use imported fabrics. All apparel products are subjected to non-preferential tari¤s of about 20%, and prior to January 2005, selected apparel categories were subjected to quota restrictions that were country speci…c.
On the other hand, EU ROOs on apparel products are considerably more restrictive. According to Annex II of the GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) guidebook which details ROOs of all products, for an apparel product to be considered originated from a country, it must start its local manufacturing process from yarn. 17 In other words, the use of imported fabrics in apparel products would result in the product failing to meet the ROOs for the purpose of tari¤ and quota preferences under GSP or EBA for the case of LDCs. It would, thus, be subject to MFN tari¤s of about 12%
to 15%.
Within the garment industry, there are two major sub-industries, namely, non-woven (knitwear and sweaters) and woven garments. Due to current production techniques, non-woven …rms are able to manufacture garments from yarn. Thus, they can easily satisfy the ROOs of the EU and can obtain tari¤ preferences at low cost. However, …rms making garments from woven material (woven …rms) mostly assemble cut fabrics into garments. Given the limited domestic supply of woven cloth 18 , it commands a premium price, so that woven garment makers can meet ROOs only by paying a roughly 20% higher price for cloth which translates into a signi…cantly higher cost of production as cloth is a lions share of the input cost. The cost of cloth to FOB price is roughly 70 75% for shirts, dresses, and trousers 19 , so that this directly translates into a 15% cost disadvantage. 20 In contrast, US ROOs do not discriminate against the origin of fabrics: assembly is all that is required. Nor does the US give tari¤ preferences to Bangladeshi garments, and the presence of country speci…c quotas in most categories makes meeting ROOs mandatory for exports.
Thus, an item exported to the US may be considered as a product of Bangladesh and imported under the quota allocation of Bangladesh. However, the same item may fail to meet the ROOs of the EU and would not qualify for the 12-15% tari¤ preference under the EBA initiative.
The Data
We use two data sets. The …rst is a limited data set on the complete set of exporters and their markets. The second is a more complete data set on a smaller subset of exporters from a …rm level survey. The …rms in our survey data are also matched with the …rms in the exporters data set.
This allows us to perform a number of cross checks on the results based on the …rm level survey data.
Firm Level Export Data
The customs data set contains data on exports for all …rms that applied for Country If we consider the distribution of …rms by number of export destinations, we …nd that of all exporting …rms, 47% only supply to one market, 34% supply to two markets, 14% to three markets, and 5% to all four markets. Figure 1 suggests that the number of markets a …rm supplies re ‡ects the productivity and competitiveness of the …rm in the world market. This is consistent with the evidence in our data. Figure 2 plots the unit value of garment exports against the total export value or the number of export destinations, we …nd a monotonic relationship exists. Firms that export to more destinations have higher average unit values and are larger in size. The former is likely to be correlated with better quality and the latter with lower cost or greater scale economies. Both are likely to be positively correlated with …rms productivity. 22 Therefore, our data is consistent with their conjectures.
Firm Level Survey Data
The and woven is 24%, 8%, and 68%, respectively. 23 Table 1 presents the sample means of the key variables by the sub-industries of non-woven and woven, and export destinations (EU vs US). In the woven sector, …rms exporting to the US tend to have larger exports; they purchase more material inputs, including imported materials, have more investment, and hire more employees. The greater investment in the US is consistent with the fact that, given ROOs, Bangladesh is likely to be slightly less competitive in wovens in the EU than in the US.
In the non-woven sector, the opposite tends to occur. In particular, …rms exporting to the EU tend to have larger exports. Particularly striking is the more than tenfold higher investment level of …rms exporting to the EU in the non-woven sector, a clear indication of expectations regarding future pro…tability. Thus, there are signi…cant di¤erences across …rms in the di¤erent industries and export destinations. It is also worth noting that the capital stock to wage bill ratio is higher for EU exporters. It is particularly so in non-wovens. This may re ‡ect the technological choices made by …rms in order to meet ROOs in non-wovens in the EU.
Before we move on to our theoretical model and the empirical tests, are there any signs in the two data sets we have that indicate that trade policy, preferences, and ROOs in the EU and US play a role in sorting …rms? The answer is yes. Overall, non-woven …rms seem to behave very di¤erently both in terms of their sales to the US and to the EU. Although the EU is the favored export destination for Bangladeshi …rms as a whole, it is less so for …rms making woven garments.
While only 24% of the sampled …rms exported more than 50% of their output to the US, i.e., were majority US exporters, 90% of these made woven garments. On the other hand, while 51% of the sampled …rms were majority EU exporters, only 58% of these made woven garments. Despite this, only 34% of all …rms exporting woven garments were majority US exporters, while 46% were majority EU exporters con…rming a EU bias even among woven …rms.
This di¤erential EU bias can be explained by the di¤erences in trade policy and ROOs in the two destinations. Overall, trade policy was harsher in the US. Though ROOs were stricter in the EU than in the US, especially in the woven sector, the EU gave signi…cant preferences to Bangladeshi exporters counteracting the stricter ROOs, and tari¤s were lower in the EU, which, unlike the US, had no quotas. This helps to explain why the EU is by far the most preferred …rst market for Bangladeshi …rms, especially for non-woven …rms.
Why is a heterogeneous …rm setup called for? Recall that if …rms were homogeneous, then all …rms would behave in the same manner and any di¤erences in behavior between them would be random. This is clearly not the case in terms of their productivity as we show below.
The Model
There has been an explosion of interest in heterogeneous …rm models in trade in the last few years. 24 However, till recently, there were few theoretical models, at least general equilibrium ones, in trade where …rm heterogeneity played a major role. Quite recently, Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) provided two quite di¤erent approaches to incorporating …rm heterogeneity in a reasonably simple and meaningful way into such models. 25 The assumptions made in the model below are based on the di¤erential ROOs and trade policies in the US and EU described earlier. We will use a simple partial equilibrium setting based on the setup in Melitz (2003) . This will serve as the basis for the intuition behind the results. 26 We …rst set up the demand side. Then we explain how …rms behave in the presence of ROOs and provide the intuition behind our results on the equilibrium e¤ects of ROOs. The complete model is in the Appendix.
Utility
Utility is given by
where Q can be thought of as the services produced by consuming q(!) of each of a continuum of varieties indexed by !. N is a numeraire good, which is freely traded and takes a unit of e¤ective labor to produce. Let the sub-utility function take the constant elasticity of substitution form so
where
is the elasticity of substitution. The cost of a util de…nes the price index
which is the price of the service given the varieties produced.
The derived demand for each variety is then the unit input requirement of the variety (which is the partial derivative of P with respect to p(!); which equals
) times the number of utils Q :
Pricing and Equilibrium
Q and P are taken as given by each …rm since there is a continuum of …rms. Firms di¤er in their productivity level and a …rm with productivity has a unit labor requirement (ULR) of 1 : With wages set at unity, such a …rm has a cost of 1 . Firms draw independently from the density function g( ): To make such a draw, the …rm must pay an entry fee of f e ; and to produce in any given period, it must pay a …xed cost f: Once is realized, it stays with the …rm forever as long as it does not die. Pro…ts are zero if a …rm exits. We assume that all varieties are symmetric. Each …rm …rst pays the entry fee, gets a draw of productivity, then decides whether to stay in or not, and if it stays in, decides which markets to serve and how.
As each variety is symmetric, and a …rm is a monopolist over its variety, price depends only on the productivity draw, not the variety per se, so pro…t maximization results in
Revenue is
where P Q E (= I; where I is total income) is aggregate expenditure on all di¤erentiated goods.
Since > 1; …rms with close to zero whose price goes to in…nity get close to zero in variable pro…ts. Note that output share and revenue share depend inversely on price relative to average price of goods produced. Using (5) and (6), it follows that per period pro…ts are ( ; :) = r( ; :) f:
As pro…ts rise with due to the envelope theorem, and since …rms pay f to produce, as well as a marginal cost, low productivity …rms will exit so that only …rms with > stay in. As a result, ex-post, is distributed as M ( ); if a mass of M …rms is in the market and gets realizations according to g( ); where
Firms are assumed to die at a constant rate , independent of age. A mass M e of …rms enters in each period and entering …rms draw their from the same distribution, g(:): Because of this assumption, in steady state, the mass of successfully entering …rms is exactly equal to the mass of …rms that die, or
Thus, if we know M and ; we know M e ; and, as will become apparent, all the endogenous variables in the model.
Using equation (3) and (5), the fact that the cuto¤ level is ; and that a mass of M …rms is in the market gives
The price index, P; depends on the cuto¤ level; ; which de…nes the representative …rm~ ( );
and the mass of …rms, M . It is easy to verify that P ( ; M ) is decreasing in ; since an increase in makes …rms more productive on average so that the average price charged falls. Similarly, an increase in M reduces P ( ; M ) as consumers like variety.
Basically, will be determined by ex post pro…ts of the marginal …rm, ( ; :) = 0: M will be determined from the ex ante condition that entry will occur till expected pro…ts from entering are zero. This de…nes the closed economy equilibrium.
Trade and Trade Policy
Next we turn to how trade and trade policy can be incorporated into our model. Trade makes the choices open to a Bangladeshi …rm more complex as …rms have additional choices: to export or not, to invoke preferences or not if these are available, and which markets to export to? Fortunately, since marginal costs are constant, decisions in each market are independent.
Assume a …rm must pay f x each period to export to any given market. There are trade costs (transport costs or tari¤s) of the iceberg form so that if > 1 units leave, one unit arrives. As a result, the pro…ts of a Bangladeshi …rm with productivity ; from exporting to market F which has an aggregate price P F ; are the same as that of a domestic …rm in F with a productivity :
Since there are …xed costs which can be more easily covered by more productive …rms with larger sales, all …rms with productivity above a threshold x will …nd it worth exporting and all …rms with productivity above will produce for the domestic market. If …xed costs of exporting are large relative to those of producing domestically, which we assume, then the cuto¤ for exports will exceed that for domestic production and only the more productive …rms will be exporters.
Incorporating Preferences and Quotas
How can ROOs be incorporated? Let the superscript j = B; U; E denote the level of the variable in Bangladesh, the US, and the EU, respectively. Let a dual superscript ij; where i; j = B; U; E and i 6 = j; denote the policy set by i on j. EB is the preference the EU gives Bangladesh and as it is country speci…c, it has a dual index. However, as Bangladesh is the only country we are considering, we can simplify our notation and denote EB by E :
If the …rm meets ROOs; its cost of production for the export market is per unit, where > 1 to re ‡ect the cost of meeting ROOs: But it faces lower tari¤s so its trade costs are ;
where < 1 is the fraction of trade costs they are exempt from. Thus, the revenue of a …rm in Bangladesh with draw ; that chooses to meet ROOs; from exporting to the US, is that of a …rm situated in the US with draw U U U : Moreover, there are …xed documentation costs of d. The revenues earned by a Bangladeshi …rm exporting to the EU and meeting ROOs are, thus, given by r( E E E ; P E ; E E ): 27 Note that for any …rm to choose to meet ROOs; must be less than unity.
The e¤ects of a quota are incorporated as a speci…c tari¤ set equal to the quota license price.
Bangladeshi Firms Choices
Bangladeshi …rms have several options to choose from in terms of serving each of their three potential markets in our model. As marginal costs are constant, their decisions in each market are independently made and a …rm chooses to serve a market if it makes positive pro…ts from doing so.
When it comes to their domestic market, …rms can not produce, or produce. Thus, from this market they get max 0;
When it comes to exporting to the EU, they can choose not to do so, export under EBA and meet ROOs, or not invoke preferences and pay the MFN tari¤. Thus, from this market they get max 0;
When it comes to serving the US market, …rms have no choice but to meet ROOs there as there are quotas. They also need to pay for a quota license. Thus, from the US market they get max 0;
; where U t U = s U B is the equilibrium price of a quota license for exporting to the US from Bangladesh.
Hence, the overall pro…ts of a Bangladeshi …rm are the sum of its pro…ts from the three markets.
A …rm serves a market if its pro…t from doing so is positive. Hence, there are three kinds of cuto¤s: the domestic cuto¤, i ; below which …rms do not serve the domestic market i, the export cuto¤ to market j, ij x ; below which …rms choose not to export to country j, and ij xr ; above which exporters choose to invoke preferences o¤ered by country j: Let B d ( ) be the abbreviated notation for total pro…ts from serving the Bangladeshi domestic market alone or the …rst line of equation (11) . Let ij x ( ) and ij xr ( ) denote the pro…ts from also exporting from country i to country j (i; j = B; E; U ) without invoking preferences and with invoking preferences, respectively. Thus, the second and third lines of equation (11) . We can make some further comparisons, but these are more subtle. First, note that ceteris paribus, an increase in the aggregate price index in a country, or an increase in its expenditure, makes pro…ts as a function of steeper. A more restrictive trade policy, i.e., a rise in tari¤s ( ); a dilution of preferences (a rise in so tari¤s are reduced by less or a rise in so preferences are more costly to obtain) or a more restrictive quota (an increase in the implicit ad valorem tari¤ equivalent t); makes the pro…t function ‡atter. Since the aggregate price index is endogenous, to proceed further, we need to show how di¤erences in exogenous variables a¤ect P and the various cuto¤ levels (the 's) we are interested in.
In the Appendix we use technique of Demidova (2005) to show that 29 if the US and EU are similar in size (so E U = E E ) and set the same tari¤s on each other as they do on Bangladesh 30 , and Bangladesh is the most protectionist, followed by the US, with the EU being the least protectionist, then the domestic cuto¤s follow the same ranking as trade barriers, i.e., the higher the trade barrier, the higher the cuto¤, while aggregate price indices follow the opposite ranking, i.e., the higher the trade barrier the lower the price index. 31 This makes the price index in the US lie below that in the EU, which, ceteris paribus, makes pro…ts from exporting to the US lower relative to those from exporting to the EU. This, in turn, widens the gap between the export cuto¤s in the US and the EU as depicted. Moreover, this di¤erence in price indices is greater, the greater the di¤erence in the trade policy stances, which magni…es the di¤erences in the export cuto¤s for Bangladeshi …rms exporting to the US and EU in non-wovens relative to wovens.
As the two industries, woven and non-woven apparel, di¤er in terms of the trade policies they face, we construct Figures 3 and 4 to re ‡ect these di¤erences. In both industries, protection is higher and the aggregate price index is lower in the US. 32 Both of these work in the same direction: namely, to ‡atten the pro…t curves of a Bangladeshi …rm from selling in the US relative to those from selling in the EU.
Thus, we also know that:
) and has the same intercept. The former is not drawn since the US has quotas so ROOs have to be met to export.
In the woven industry, see Figure 3 , there are fewer advantages of selling in the EU relative to selling in the US. Meeting ROOs does not give as much of a bene…t because they are costly to meet in wovens. Hence, the line for exporting and obtaining preferences to the EU starts out below that for exporting without meeting ROOs, but is not much steeper. It is also not much steeper than the line for exporting to the US (where ROOs must be met anyway). As a result, few …rms choose to export to the EU and meet the ROOs; i.e., In summary, the model has the following predictions:
1. The productivity distributions of groups of …rms can be ordered in terms of …rst order stochastic dominance.
(a) As trade policy in the EU is less restrictive overall, its price index is higher and …rms that 3 2 One could be agnostic about where the lower price index in the US is coming from ore one could use the results in the Appendix to argue that this arises internally from the model as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) as done in the Appendix. 3 3 Note the di¤erence in the de…nition of BE xr and BU xr which arises as …rms exporting to the US have no choice but to meet ROOs: export mostly to the EU will need to be less productive than others. More precisely, the productivity distribution of Bangladeshi majority exporters to the EU is overall likely to be …rst order stochastically dominated by that of other …rms. 34 (b) As trade policy in the US is more restrictive overall, …rms that export mostly to the US will need to be more productive than others. More precisely, the productivity distribution of Bangladeshi majority exporters to the US is overall likely to …rst order stochastically dominate (FOSD) that of other exporters to the EU.
(c) As the di¤erence in the trade policy stance in the US and EU in wovens is smaller, their export cuto¤s will be closer, and …rms that export to them will be more similar than in non-wovens. Hence, it will be harder to reject the null hypothesis that both their distributions are the same.
(d) As EU preferences are easy to obtain in non-wovens, …rms that export to the US in nonwovens will be much more productive than those exporting to the EU. More precisely, the productivity distribution of Bangladeshi exporters to the US in non-wovens FOSD that of exporters to the EU.
(e) Firms that invoke ROOs are more productive than those that do not. More precisely, the productivity distribution of Bangladeshi exporters to the EU who invoke ROOs must FOSD that of all exporters to the EU or of exporters who do not invoke ROOs:
2. Firms who export to both markets are more productive than those who do not. More broadly, there should be a positive correlation between the number of markets a …rm exports to and its productivity, such that the single market …rms are the least productive.
3. Di¤erences in …rm concentration across various markets and activities are predicted.
(a) The proportion of …rms that export to the US should be smaller than the proportion of …rms who export to the EU in both woven and non-woven industries.
(b) A larger fraction of Bangladeshi …rms should sell to the EU in the non-woven sector than in the woven sector.
(c) The fraction of …rms who sell to the EU and invoke ROOs should be higher in the non-woven sector.
Parts (a) and (b) of prediction 3 above are clear from Table 1 . By matching the custom data set and the …rm survey we also …nd evidence in support of part (c). While 58 percent of the …rms in non-wovens who sell to the EU invoke ROOs, only 40 percent do so in wovens. We now turn to the data to see if predictions 1 and 2 are borne out.
Productivity Estimates and Results
To obtain the productivity of …rms, we need to estimate the …rm's production function, taking into account total factor usage per unit of output. In the …rm survey we asked …rms to provide the annual increase in the main product price and the main material input price. This …rm level price information allows us to construct …rm level price indices for outputs and inputs, which we use to de ‡ate sales and material costs to obtain real output and material levels. This is considerably better than what the existing literature has been doing, which is to use an industry price index to de ‡ate …rm sales, which by construction will overestimate the price, and thus, underestimate the output of the more productive …rms.
We estimate the following Cobb Douglas production function,
where i and t are the indexes for …rm and year, respectively. In logs, output, Y it , is linearly related to labor, L it , materials, M it , and capital stock, K it . Firm capital stock, K it ; is constructed by summing real investment, I it ; over the years using perpetual inventory method with an annual depreciation rate, ; of 10%:
with initial capital stock, K i0 ; being constructed using an average of the …rm's …rst year …xed asset, F i1 , and the in…nite sum series of investment prior to the …rst year, assuming a zero growth rate of investment and a depreciation rate of 10%. Firms'real investment, I it , is obtained by de ‡ating nominal investment from the …rm survey by the GDP de ‡ator of domestic …xed capital formation of Bangladesh in the respective years.
According to (12) ; any part of Y it that is not explained by the three factors of production is attributed to productivity, it , which varies by …rm and year. In other words, if we regress ln Y it on ln L it , ln M it ; and ln K it using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, the regression errors are the …rms productivity, ln it .
However, …rm's input choices are endogenous -they depend on the productivity of the …rm which is known to the …rm but not the researcher. Such input endogeneity will bias OLS coe¢ cients of labor and materials upward since more productive …rms will also have higher levels of output.
By omitting the …rm productivity when we regress ln Y it on ln L it , ln M it ; and ln K it using OLS estimation, the error terms are positively correlated with ln L it , ln M it ; and ln K it ; which leads to upward bias in the coe¢ cients.
In addition, if larger, older …rms tend to stay in business despite low productivity, while younger, smaller …rms tend to quit more easily, such endogenous exit decisions of the …rms will bias OLS estimates of the coe¢ cient on capital downwards. In other words, by omitting …rm productivity when we regress ln Y it on ln L it , ln M it ; and ln K it using OLS estimation, the error terms may also be negatively correlated with ln K it due to the endogenous exit decision, which will bias the coe¢ cient on ln K it downward.
To address this input endogeneity bias and selectivity bias, we follow a 3-step nonlinear estimation methodology developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) which yields consistent estimates. In their model, the unobserved productivity, ln it ; is the only state variable in each year t that follows a common exogenous Markov process, which, jointly with …xed input, ln K it , and its age, determines the exit decision and investment demand, ln I it ; of the …rms. Consider only the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, so …rm's expectations match the realization of future productivity. Then we can use a polynomial function of ln I it ; ln K it ; and age to control for the unobserved productivity, ln it : 35
The polynomial function is assumed to be common across all …rms in all years. Furthermore, to control for the exit decision, they estimate a Probit regression to obtain the surviving probability 3 5 This is possible because, given ln Kit; ln Iit is an increasing function of ln it ; which makes the function invertible.
and use that to control for the part of unobserved productivity that is negatively correlated with
For the Olley and Pakes procedure to perform well, it is crucial that there be no systematic measurement errors in output and inputs which may be correlated with the productivity of the …rms. However, in our current data set, there are some reasons this may be an issue. First, there are by all accounts …rm speci…c fraudulent accounting practices prevailing in Bangladesh. Firms with higher productivity are more pro…table, and have the most incentives to overstate material costs and understate sales in order to reduce corporate tax liability. Such accounting practices will bias the coe¢ cient on materials downward as the arti…cially high material cost is negatively correlated with the arti…cially low output. Without knowledge of how each …rm manipulates its books, this …rm speci…c accounting practice can only be controlled for by using …rm speci…c e¤ects as done here.
Second, since we use head counts of employees to measure labor input, labor is less prone to such accounting fraud. However, the number of employees may systematically underestimate the actual labor input for the more productive …rms, if more productive …rms o¤er more overtime opportunities and attract better quality workers. This type of measurement error in labor input (one that is positively correlated with …rm productivity) will bias the Olley-Pakes estimates on labor upwards. Incorporating a …rm speci…c e¤ect should help with this as well.
Finally, we need to address the loss in output due to labor strikes called for by the opposition party (hartals) which a¤ect all …rms within a year. Such labor strikes decrease the output of all …rms, but given that strikes are the constitutional right of workers in Bangladesh, do not a¤ect employment. This introduces an upward bias in the measurement of labor and downward bias in its coe¢ cient. We control for this type of measurement error in labor by incorporating year speci…c e¤ects.
We, therefore, modify the three stage nonlinear estimation technique of Olley and Pakes (1996) to include …rm and year …xed e¤ects, and only rely on the within variation to estimate L and M in the …rst stage. The results of the regressions are reported in Table 2 . Column (1) of Table 2 shows the OLS estimation with no correction for endogeneity, selectivity, or measurement errors that are speci…c to …rms and years. These estimates are likely to be biased as argued.
Column (2) reports the …rst stage results of the usual OP procedure, where a 3rd order polynomial function of investment, capital, and age is included as a control for the unobserved …rm productivity. Note that using the usual OP correction does not change the coe¢ cient on labor and materials by much relative to OLS -while the coe¢ cient on material is marginally lower, the coe¢ cient on labor is marginally higher. We believe this is because of the measurement problems discussed above. Our belief is supported by the estimates moving as explained below.
Column (3) includes …rm …xed e¤ects in the OP procedure to address measurement errors that are speci…c to the …rms. The within estimate of the coe¢ cient of materials is signi…cantly higher, which is consistent with our argument that more productive …rms systematically overstate material costs and understate sales. On the other hand, the within estimate of the coe¢ cient of labor is signi…cantly lower, which is consistent with our argument that head counts are hard to fudge but that more productive …rms tend to attract better workers. This leads to the upward bias in Column (2).
Column (4) presents the within OP estimates controlling for both …rm and year …xed e¤ects.
As suspected, controlling for year e¤ects further reduces the upward measurement errors in labor due "hartals"that negatively a¤ect the output of all …rms in a given year. This leads the estimates in Column (4) to be higher than those in Column (3). Thus, correcting for input endogeneity and measurement errors, our estimates of the coe¢ cients of materials and labor are 0.715 and 0.255, respectively.
Given the estimates presented in Column (4), Column (5) presents the within OP estimates with correction for selectivity bias to obtain the estimates for the coe¢ cients of capital and age. This is obtained by …rst estimating the exit decision of the …rms using a Probit regression on a 3rd order polynomial function of investment, capital, and age, controlling for year, region, and industry …xed e¤ects. This regression yields the propensity for a …rm to stay in business. We
, constructed using the consistent estimates of L and M from Column (4), on age, capital, a 3rd order polynomial function of propensity of survival,
The 3rd order polynomial function of propensity of survival,
is used as a control for the unobserved productivity that is related to capital and age, such that the remaining regression error is not related to capital and age, which is necessary for us to obtain consistent estimates on the coe¢ cients of capital and age.
This last-stage nonlinear regression gives us our estimated coe¢ cient on capital,^ K and age, and is presented in Column (5).
Relative to Column (1), the estimated coe¢ cient on capital is reduced from 0.025 to 0.021, suggesting that the endogeneity of capital dominates the selection bias due to …rms'exit decision, which leads to an overall upward bias in the OLS estimate of K . In addition, while older …rms seem to be more productive, the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi…cant. Based on results presented in Column (5), …rm productivity is constructed as the following:
which forms the basis of our empirical exercise.
Testing for Stochastic Dominance
We use a nonparametric test of stochastic dominance, developed in Anderson (1996) to test whether the productivity distributions of …rms serving di¤erent markets in di¤erent industries are indeed statistically di¤erent as predicted by our model. Given that this is a relatively new technique, we will brie ‡y describe the methodology, which is an extension of the Pearson goodness of …t test. 
is the discrete empirical analogue of the probability density function, namely, the relative frequency in each interval, and x j i is the frequency of observations in sample i in interval j; and n i is the size of sample i: Given that sum of all x j i must equal to n i ; vector x i = x 1 i ; :::; x J i is distributed as a multinomial distribution with
By the multivariate central limit theorem, x i being multinomial distributed implies that as n i approaches in…nitely, x i asymptotically follows a normal distribution:
This allows us to form test statistics based on p i = x i =n i : De…ne I f as the J by J cumulative sum matrix, which is a J-dimensional lower triangular matrix (including the diagonal) of 1's: 36 
The test that distribution A FOSD B boils down to:
where under H 0 ; distributions A and B are statistically the same, whereas under H 1 , distribution A statistically FOSD B: It is possible that the test does not support either H 0 or H 1 ; in which case, while distribution A is not the same as B; we could not say one distribution FOSD the other, which leads to the conclusion of indeterminacy in stochastic dominance. Let = p A p B and f = I f : Under H 0 ; the distributions A and B are the same as the pooled distribution: Anderson (1996) shows that under H 0 ; and f have well de…ned asymptotically normal distributions, and dividing each element of f by its standard deviation permits multiple comparisons using the studentized maximum modulus distribution (Stoline and Ury, 1979) .
where m = n 1 n A + n B =n A n B ; and n 1 = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
and
To implement the test, we separate the pooled sample into 10 intervals according to the deciles of the pooled distribution. The hypothesis that distribution A FOSD distribution B requires that no element of f is statistically greater than 0 and at least one element of f is statistically less than 0. Since the test is perfectly symmetric, if no element of f is statistically less than 0 and at least one element of f is statistically greater than 0, then we can conclude that distribution B FOSD distribution A: In both cases, P AT needs to be statistically di¤erent from zero to reject H 0 that distributions A and B are the same. If at least one element of f is statistically greater than 0, while at least one element of f is statistically less than 0, then we conclude that stochastic dominance of distributions A and B is undetermined. We use this multiple comparison test coupled with the 2 (J 1) statistic to check the prediction of our model with data. 37 
Majority EU vs. Majority US Exporters
Based on the productivity estimates, we relate …rm productivity to the export destinations of the …rms. Table 3 presents the empirical results of the regressions. Column (1) shows the di¤erences in …rm productivity when comparing majority EU exporters to non-majority EU exporters, using within …rm variations. The slope coe¢ cient is identi…ed by those …rms that switch from minority to majority EU exporter status, or vice-versa. On average, when a …rm switches from a non-majority EU exporter status to a majority EU exporter status, there is a drop in productivity of 7.0% which is statistically signi…cant. 38 This is controlling for …rm and year …xed e¤ects, and therefore, is independent of the industry in which the …rm is operating. Column (2) presents the di¤erences in …rm productivity when …rms switch from being a non-majority US exporter to a majority US exporter. On average, there is an 8.9% increase in productivity to be a majority US exporter, controlling for …rm and year …xed e¤ects.
The above regression estimates reveal a mean di¤erence in such …rms. However, the model prediction is that the entire distribution should move due to the implied truncation. We present the nonparametric test for …rst order stochastic dominance in Table 4 . This is a multiple comparison test based on the 10 decile intervals of the pooled distribution. The 1, 5, and 10 percent signi…cant levels are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Column (1) compares the productivity distribution of majority EU exporters (distribution A) to that of the rest of the …rms (distribution B).
Positive numbers imply that the cumulative distribution of A lies above that of B; and vice-versa.
Given that none of the elements is statistically negative, while …ve are statistically positive, the null hypothesis of a common distribution is rejected in favor of the hypothesis that distribution B FOSD distribution A: In other words, the multiple comparison test suggests that the productivity distribution of majority EU exporters is dominated by the productivity distribution of the other …rms. The 2 (J 1) statistic listed at the bottom of the table also rejects the null hypothesis that the productivity distributions of these two sets of …rms are the same, which further supports our …nd-ings. Thus, overall, not only is the mean of the former is less than that of the latter, the hypothesis that the productivity distribution of majority EU exporters is …rst order stochastic dominated by the non-majority EU exporters is statistically supported. 39 Figure 5 further shows the continuous representation of the sample CDFs of the two distributions. As expected, we see that the CDF for majority EU exporters lies above that of the non-majority EU exporters. 40 3 8 Given that the export status variable is a discrete dummy variable, the percentage e¤ect of switching status is
Similarly, Column (2) of Table 4 compares the productivity distribution of majority US exporters (distribution A) to that of the rest of the …rms (distribution B). Most of the elements listed in Column (2) are statistically negative and none is statistically positive which indicates that the productivity distribution of …rms that mainly export to the US FOSD that of the remaining …rms. The 2 (J 1) statistic also rejects the null hypothesis that productivity distributions of these two sets of …rms are the same. We also see in Figure 6 that the CDF for majority US exporters lies below that of the remaining …rms with similar consequences.
Thus, there are some clear di¤erences in terms of the productivity of …rms depending on the market they mostly export to. Overall, the results of these nonparametric tests of stochastic dominance support our regression results, which are that …rms sort themselves into markets of di¤erent toughness according to their productivity.
Woven vs. Non-Woven Industries
The theoretical model also explains how …rms sort themselves out in terms of their productivity as a function of di¤erences in trade policy across industries. Relying on between …rm variations, Column (3) of Table 3 shows that, controlling for industry and year …xed e¤ects, …rms that supply a majority of their products to the EU market are, on average, 24% less productive than …rms that do not supply a majority of their products to the EU market. 41 However, for woven …rms, the productivity di¤erence between majority EU exporters and the other …rms is statistically insigni…cant. This is illustrated by interacting the woven industry dummy with the majority EU exporter dummy, and the estimated e¤ect is -0.268+0.233=-0.035, which is not statistically di¤erent from zero. 42 Similarly, Column (4) shows the between …rm productivity di¤erences between majority US exporters and minority US exporters, controlling for industry and year …xed e¤ects. On average, …rms that supply a majority of their products to the US market are 42% more productive than …rms that supply a minority of their products to the US markets. However, the productivity gap is not statistically signi…cant in the woven industry, where the estimate e¤ect is 0.047 and is not 4 1 Note that di¤erences between US and EU exporters using within estimates are smaller than those using between estimates. This makes sense if productivity evolves slowly over time so that …rms switching from, say, being US majority to EU majority exporters remain close to the cuto¤.signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Columns (5) and (6) relate …rm productivity to the actual shares of the EU and US in …rm exports, allowing for …rms in the woven industry to have di¤erent e¤ects and controlling for year and industry …xed e¤ects. Both these columns are using the between …rm variations. Column (5) shows that for the non-woven …rms, every 1 percentage point increase in export share to the EU is associated with a productivity decrease of 0.32%. On the other hand, for the woven …rms, increases in export share to the EU do not correlate with the productivity of …rms. Similarly, Column (6) shows that for the non-woven …rms, for every 1 percentage point increase in export share to the US, …rm productivity increases by 0.44%, but that there is no such signi…cant productivity change for the woven …rms.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 present three tests for the non-woven …rms. The …rst compares non-woven …rms that supply only to the EU market (distribution A) with all other exporters.
Not only are these …rms in distribution A the single market …rms, they also are operating in a market where ROOs are not binding. Thus, our model predicts that these …rms should have a productivity distribution that is …rst order stochastically dominated by that of exporters that do not solely export to the EU. Column (1) presents the test statistics. Six out of ten elements in f are statistically greater than 0, one is negative but far from signi…cant. The 2 (J 1) statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the productivity distribution of these two sets of …rms are the same.
Similar results are obtained when we split the sample according to majority versus minority EU exporters.
Column (2) compares the productivity distributions of …rms solely exporting to the non-EU market in the non-woven industry, to the rest of the …rms in the non-woven industry. Given that Bangladeshi …rms have tari¤ preferences exporting to the EU, our model predicts that only the more productive …rms will be able to compete with exporters from other countries such as China and India in the non-EU market. Column (2) presents the multiple comparison test statistics. None of the elements is statistically positive, while two out of ten are statistically less than zero indicating that the productivity distribution of …rms exporting to non-EU market …rst order stochastic dominates that of …rms who do not export to the non-EU market. The 2 (J 1) statistic also rejects the null hypothesis that the productivity distributions of these two sets of …rms are the same.
Column (3) compares the productivity distributions of …rms exporting to the US market in the non-woven industry, to …rms that do not export to the US market. Given that Bangladeshi …rms have to face the MFA tari¤ exporting to the US, our model predicts that only the most productive …rms will be successful in the US market. None of the elements in Column (3) is statistically positive, while four out of ten are statistically negative, suggesting that …rms that export to the US market in the non-woven industry are indeed more productive. The 2 (J 1) statistic also rejects the null hypothesis that the productivity distributions of these two sets of …rms are the same, which further supports the hypothesis.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 5 relate to the woven industry. As expected, the EU cuto¤ in the woven industry is close to the export cuto¤ so that …rms that solely supply to the EU market do not look di¤erent from other …rms. Similarly, …rms that do not supply to the EU market, or …rms that export to the US market are not statistically di¤erent in terms of productivity from other …rms. Note that there are both positive and negative numbers in these three columns with only one being signi…cant. The chi square test does not reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same. 43 Overall, the results support the theoretical model that ROOs of the EU and US have signi…cant e¤ects in sorting di¤erent …rms into di¤erent markets, depending on whether such rules are binding.
For the non-woven industries, given that ROOs of the EU and US are not binding, the existence of tari¤ preference in the EU market allows the less productive …rms to access the EU market, while for the woven industries, ROOs of the EU are binding, which makes the EU less attractive, and we do not observe signi…cant productivity di¤erentials among woven …rms supplying these two markets.
Do More Productive Firms Invoke Binding ROOs?
To perform some robustness checks, we further merge the customs data set with our …rm survey by manually comparing …rm names. There are 196 exporters covered in the …rm survey in 2003, which is the latest year we have the …rm survey data set for. However, only 119 of these can be matched to the customs data which is for 2004. 44 We can use this information to further study the e¤ects of ROOs by comparing the productivity of these matched …rms to that of other …rms 4 3 The careful reader, looking at Table 1 , might ask whether the higher investment rates in non-wovens for majority EU exporters together with our capital construction technique drive our results. After all, higher investment would translate into higher capital and this would tend to bring TFP down. To reassure ourselves, we recalculated TFP using only asset information, re-did Table 5 , and con…rmed that our results still held. 4 4 Among these 119 matched …rms, 78 are in the woven industry. To study the e¤ect of binding ROOs on …rm productivity, we interact the majority EU exporter variable and the EU export shares with a dummy variable which equals one if the …rms export to the EU under GSP, and therefore, satisfy ROOs. Table 6 presents the cross section OLS regression results. In Column (1), we relate …rm TFP to the majority EU exporter variable and its interaction term with GSP status in the sub-sample of 64 non-woven …rms. As in Table 3 , …rms that export majority of their products to the EU are signi…cantly less productive, and those …rms that satisfy
ROOs are no di¤erent. In Column (2), we restrict the sample to the 132 woven …rms. Similarly to the previous …nding in Table 3 , within the non-woven industry where ROOs are not binding, …rms that export majority of their products to the EU are no di¤erent from …rms that do not export majority of their products to the EU. However, in the woven industry, those …rms that satisfy
ROOs and export to EU under GSP are statistically more productive in line with the predictions of the model.
Columns (3) and (4) repeat the same exercises but instead of using majority EU exporter dummy, we use the actual export share of the EU of these …rms in 2003. Firms that satisfy ROOs and who can therefore export under GSP preference do seem to be, on average, more productive than other …rms. Table 7 presents the nonparametric test for …rst order stochastic dominance of productivity distributions comparing …rms that satisfying ROOs to those that do not satisfy ROOs in both non-woven and woven industries. Given that the sample size is quite a bit smaller in this subsample, we only split it into 6 intervals according to the sextiles of the pooled sample. Column (1) compares the productivity distribution of the majority EU exporters that satisfy ROOs in the non-woven industry to the majority EU exporters that do not satisfy ROOs: While the CDF of the ROOs …rms lies below that of the non-ROOs …rms, given that all elements of Column (1) are negative, none of the elements is statistically negative, which suggests that the productivity distribution of …rms that meet ROOs is not statistically di¤erent from that of the other …rms in the non-woven industry. Column (2) repeats the exercise for the woven …rms. Here the multiple comparison test concludes that ROOs satisfying …rms are indeed more productive. These results are supported by the 2 (J 1) statistics. In summary, we …nd statistical evidence supporting our theoretical model: when ROOs are not binding, the associated tari¤ preference allows the less productive …rms to export; when ROOs are binding, only the more productive …rms can satisfy ROOs and export.
E¤ects of Quota
In this matched data set, we can further test the e¤ects of US quota on …rm productivity. In theory, by making the trade policies of the US more restrictive, a quota should reduce the price index in equilibrium via the market potential e¤ect which would raise the export productivity cuto¤ for Bangladeshi …rms. The quota would also reduce the pro…tability of exporting to the US at a given price index, as ROOs have to be met and documented, which would also raise this cuto¤. Thus, …rms exporting under quota should be more productive. Figure 7 presents the CDF of US exporters with or without quota restrictions. This seems to suggest that …rms exporting under quota tend to be more productive. Column (3) of Table 7 compares the productivity distribution of …rms export to US under quota restriction to those without quota restrictions. While all elements are negative which suggests that the CDF of the quota …rms are lower than that of the non-quota …rms, none of the elements is statistically signi…cant, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that the productivity distributions are the same. This highlights the importance of statistically testing for stochastic dominance, rather than just eyeballing the CDFs.
The Number of Export Destinations
Finally, we look at the number of export destinations using the customs data set. Bangladeshi exporters to the US tend to be of higher productivity, and, therefore, of the multi market type.
Again, this is consistent with the evidence in Figure 1 . In contrast, as the EU gives preferences at little cost, …rms in this group tend to have lower productivity and a lower cuto¤. As a result, there are more …rms of the single market type (low productivity type) in this group. For the smaller …rm level survey data with 232 …rms we plot in Figure 8 the TFP's of single and multi market …rms as well as their sales. As expected, the TFP of the latter is higher on average. We also compare their distributions and they are statistically di¤erent at the 10% level. 45 
Conclusion
Our …ndings are important for a number of reasons. First, our work is the …rst to predict how …rms would tend to sort themselves across markets in response to di¤erences in trade policy, preferences, and the costs of obtaining these preferences.
Second, we are also the …rst to test for these predictions in the data. We feel our results renew one's faith in economics: to conclude that the predictions of a rather abstract model, (Melitz 2003) , for an essentially unobservable variable, (TFP), …nd support in the data is quite something! Third, our work shows how the apparently liberal preferences provided by developed countries may well be far less liberal than they seem as they are undone by strict ROOs. This is the case with EU preferences for woven apparel exports from Bangladesh. Preferences are more liberal for nonwoven apparel but as this is more capital intensive than the woven sector, investment is directed away from the direction of natural comparative advantage. 46 In a second best world with capital constraints, this could end up signi…cantly eroding the gains from preferences. It might even end up being worse than having no preferences! Another interesting recent policy issue of some importance in the Indian subcontinent as a whole is the issue of regional cumulation. Since the availability of domestic fabric is a binding constraint for Bangladesh to access EBA preferences in its exports to the EU of woven apparel, the EU had granted regional cumulation to SAARC (South Asian Association Regional Cooperation) countries. So far, the Bangladeshi textile industry has successfully opposed regional cumulation.
According to the rules of cumulation, textiles made in other SAARC countries could be used by Bangladeshi exporters of woven apparel without compromising Bangladeshi origin if the value added in Bangladesh exceeds 50%. 47 In fact, even products made outside Bangladesh would be eligible for duty free access to the EU if the value added by Bangladeshi inputs exceeded 50% (reverse origin). Thus, not only could Bangladesh use low quality cheap Indian textiles and export to the EU, but India could use high quality Bangladeshi textiles (so value added in Bangladesh is more than 50%) and export under the EBA to the EU! Thus, high end textile producers in Bangladesh and low end textile producers in India may gain from such cumulation, but high end apparel producers in Bangladesh would likely lose. 4 6 The huge investment in the non-woven sector by majority EU exporters is apparent in Table 1 . 4 7 See Development Initiative (2005), pg. 5. A 3rd order polynomial function of age, capital and investment are included.
2
A 3rd order polynomial function of propensity to stay in business and the …tted output net of labor and capital are included. 
18.217
Note: *, **, *** denotes signi…cant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
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